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Abstract. Smartphone location-based methods have been proposed and imple-
mented as an effective alternative to traditional labor intensive contact tracing 
methods. However, there are serious privacy and security concerns that may im-
pede wide-spread adoption in many societies. Furthermore, these methods rely 
solely on proximity to patients, based on Bluetooth or GPS signal, ignoring lin-
gering effects of virus, including COVID-19, present in the environment. This 
results in inaccurate risk assessment and incomplete contact tracing. A new sys-
tem concept called PrivyTRAC preserves user privacy, increases security and 
improves accuracy of smartphone contact tracing. PrivyTRAC enhances users’ 
and patients’ privacy by letting users conduct self-evaluation based on the risk 
maps download to their smartphones. No user information is transmitted to ex-
ternal locations or devices, and no personally identifiable patient information is 
embedded in the risk maps as they are processed anonymized and aggregated 
confirmed patient locations. The risk maps consider both spatial proximity and 
temporal effects to improve the accuracy of the infection risk estimation. Exper-
iments conducted in the paper illustrate improvement of PrivyTRAC over prox-
imity-based methods in terms of true and false positives. An approach to further 
improve infection risk estimation by incorporating both positive and negative lo-
cal test results from contacts of confirmed cases is also described. 
Keywords: Contact Tracing, Privacy Preserving, Smartphone Locations, Risk 
Estimation, Spatio-temporal Effects, COVID-19 
1 Introduction 
As severe travel restrictions due to COVID-19 are being gradually relaxed in order to 
minimize further damage to the economy, it is expected that there will be continued 
cases of infection and pockets of community transmission until vaccines become 
widely available. To prevent sporadic cases from becoming sources of another out-
break, rigorous contact tracing is essential. Compared to the traditional approach of 
interviewing patients, the smartphone location-based approach has proven to be an ef-
fective alternative to accomplish comprehensive contact tracing with much less labor 
demands. However, there are serious privacy and security concerns associated with the 
smartphone-based methods that may impede adoption and wide-spread use in the many 
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societies [1]. Effectiveness of the smartphone contact tracing approach can be signifi-
cantly improved with active cooperation from the public by alleviating the security and 
privacy concerns.  
We propose a privacy-preserving, secure and accurate COVID-19 contact tracing 
systems called PrivyTRAC: Privacy and Security Preserving Contact Tracing System. 
PrivyTRAC 
1. is a smartphone location-based contact tracing system with security and privacy in-
herent in the tracing mechanism that protects the privacy of both the patients and the 
public, and 
2. infers from confirmed cases COVID-19 infection risk at given places and time that 
allows individuals to self-assess exposure risk from their movement histories. 
The proposed system, illustrated in Fig. 1, is built on two innovations (see Section 3 
for details). One is the innovative mechanism that utilizes the infection risk maps (Step 
1 in Fig. 1), which are processed from anonymized, aggregated patient locations infor-
mation, that individual users can download to a smartphone App (Step 2). The users 
can then evaluate locally their own risks of contracting COVID-19 due to contacts (Step 
3). This mechanism does not require users to upload their personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) to an external platform, nor do the users need to broadcast their PII to other 
smartphones in vicinity. 
The second innovation is the estimation of the spatio-temporal infection risk maps 
that allow users to self-assess their own risks. The risk maps consider not only the spa-
tial proximity to COVID-19 patients, as in most contact tracing approaches, but also 
the temporal effect of how long the virus can stay virulent in the environment. We have 
learned that the novel coronavirus can remain contagious on surface for an extended 
period of time [2,3] and virus-containing droplets can travel significant distances [4,5]. 
The risk-based approach that considers not only instantaneous proximity to the patients 
but also the lagging effects after a patient has left thus offers a more accurate risk as-
sessment of contracting the virus. Furthermore, as researchers continue to learn the fac-
tors that influence the virus spread, new findings can be quickly incorporated into our 
risk estimation model to refine the risk maps. 
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Fig. 1. PrivyTRAC Contract Tracing Process and Information Flow 
2 Current Smartphone Location-based Contact Tracing 
Methods 
Many smartphone location-based contact tracing approaches have been proposed or 
implemented recently [2,5,6,7,8,9,10]. They generally fall into two categories. One is 
to aggregate all smartphone movements of a population, whether a person is ill or not, 
in a centralized repository to identify encounters with the confirmed COVID-19 cases. 
The other category of methods is to use a phone’s Bluetooth radio to record encounters 
of all other phones in proximity [3] and later alert the user when the unique cell phone 
ID of a confirmed case matches an ID in the user’s phone. 
These two approaches suffer two main drawbacks – the first is privacy and security, 
and the second is accuracy. Their mechanisms require exposing individuals’ locations 
and unique IDs, either in a centralized, externally maintained repository or to all other 
phones in vicinity. Privacy concerns may cause people to be less willing to adopt the 
tools, and hence render the tools less effective. Moreover, whether individuals’ move-
ment data and their encounters with other people are stored centrally or locally, there is 
always inherent risk that sophisticated and determined hackers can exploit software 
weaknesses to acquire personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals and their 
encounters, similar to the actions taken by some data brokers and aggregators for ad-
vertising purposes. In fact, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
has issued warning of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors exploiting the COVID-
19 pandemic to collect bulk personal information [4]. 
Besides privacy and security concerns, those contact-tracing tools offer an incom-
plete measure for determining the infection risk. As we have learned, novel coronavirus 
can survive on surface for an extended period of time and its droplets can travel for 
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extended distances, depending on the surface materials and other environmental factors. 
A person does not need to be in the immediate vicinity of a patient to be exposed to the 
virus through indirect contacts. Hence, determining a person’s risk of contracting the 
virus based solely on direct proximity to the infected does not provide an accurate risk 
assessment. 
3 PrivyTRAC Approach 
3.1 System Architecture 
Our contact-tracing approach PrivyTRAC is illustrated in Fig. 1. The system consists 
of two main components – one residing on individual users’ smartphones and the other 
on the server. On the user side, the smartphone App regularly (or as requested by the 
users) downloads up-to-date spatio-temporal exposure risk maps from the server. The 
risk maps quantify the likelihoods of infection at particular locations and time. Based 
on the maps, the App would then cross-check with the user’s smartphone locations data. 
Using the risk maps and the locations data, the App computes the aggregated risk of 
contracting the virus. If the person’s risk exceeds a certain threshold, the App would 
notify the person and suggest follow-on actions, such as the testing sites for confirma-
tion. 
Under this process, a user’s private locations history and PII never leave his/her own 
phone nor are they being recorded by other phones. Patients’ privacy is preserved as 
well, since the patients remain anonymous and the downloaded risk maps contain only 
processed and aggregated locations information from many patients, making it ex-
tremely challenging to extract PII. Furthermore, the ability for users to maintain control 
of their private data and decide when the service is activated will significantly encour-
age adoption by the public. 
On the server side, the spatio-temporal risk maps are computed and continually up-
dated as new cases are reported. The movement histories of confirmed cases are col-
lected by public health agencies. The sever software computes the infection risks at 
particular locations and time, based on the aggregated locations of the patients from the 
public health agencies and factors affecting the virus’ persistent virulence. Those fac-
tors include distance from an infected person, durations of the virus’ survival on various 
surface materials, length of exposure, and environmental conditions such as tempera-
ture and sunlight. By incorporating the disease vector and environment’s effects on 
virulence rather than merely considering direct encounters based on smartphone prox-
imity, the resulting infection risk estimation is more comprehensive and accurate. 
3.2 Infection Risk Map Computation 
To evaluate the risk of contracting the disease from an infected person, we assume that 
the probability of infection decreases exponentially with distance and time. For the risk 
analysis, we consider a spatio-temporal grid consists of 1 meter by 1 meter by 1 second 
cells. If a person with the disease stays in a 1 meter by 1 meter area centered at location 
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(xp, yp) for 1 second around time 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝, a person in an area of the same size around location 
(x, y) for 1 second around time t is assumed to have the probability of contracting the 
disease (𝐶𝐶 = 1) as follows: 
𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝, 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝� = �𝑝𝑝0 exp �− �𝑥𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�2𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2 − �𝑦𝑦−𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝�2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 − �𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝�2𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 � if 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝0 otherwise (1) 
If there are a total of N such spatio-temporal cells (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) with a patient present, 
regardless of whether they are occupied by the same patient or not, a person in the 1 m. 
by 1 m. by 1 sec. cell (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡) has the probability of being infected as follows: 
𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁� =          1 −∏ �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ��𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  (2) 
Note that the cells (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) are not necessarily due to the same patient. Hence, we 
can easily aggregate multiple patients in the same risk map. 
If a person is in the area for a certain duration, we consider each contact within one 
second as an independent event. Hence, the person’s overall probability of contracting 
the disease is 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1| 𝑠𝑠 ) =  1 −∏ ∏ �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ��𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1  (3) 
where s represents a sequence of M such 1 m by 1 m by 1 sec spatial-temporal cells (𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗) that the person of interest occupies in the vicinity of infected people. 
Based on the above analysis, an area risk map can be created from Eq. (2). By using 
aggregated locations and time of people with the disease (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ), the risk of con-
tracting the disease 𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁� at any location and time (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡) can be computed. When a user downloads the spatio-temporal risk map into 
their smartphone App, their own individual risk 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1| 𝑠𝑠 ) can be computed by the 
App according to the location history s on the smartphone using Eq. (3). The App can 
apply a risk-based metric, for example, to advise whether a person should seek further 
medical help based on their probability of contracting COVID-19 due to the contacts. 
To illustrate the varying risk of contracting the disease depending on the distance 
from an infected person and the elapsed time since the person’s presence, we plot in 
Fig. 2 the log-probability of infection. For this example, it is assumed that a patient is 
present at time 0 at location xp = 0 and yp = 50 for 1 second. We also assign 𝑝𝑝0 =0.01 √2𝜋𝜋⁄ , 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥 = 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 = 1 and 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = 100 in Eq. (1). The resultant log-probabilities 
𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥 = 0, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 = 0, 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝 = 50, 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 0� of infection risk for different y locations 
(vertical axis) at different time (horizontal axis) after the 1-second presence of the pa-
tient at time 0 are shown in Fig. 2. The figure shows that despite the patient not being 
present (or in proximity) after the initial 1 second, the risk of contracting the disease is 
still present, albeit small as elapsed time increases. Hence, to fully account for the risk 
of contracting the disease for contact tracing purposes, it’s essential not only to consider 
the immediate proximity to the patient but also the lingering effects of the virus in time. 
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Fig. 2. Log-probability of infection risk when a patient is at location y = 50 for 1 second 
4 Simulation Experiment Results 
To illustrate the difference between the risk-based and the proximity-based contact trac-
ing approaches, we conducted simulated experiments of the two methods. In the exper-
iments, we consider an area of 100 meters by 100 meters (Fig. 3) in a 350-second span. 
At the beginning of this time span t = 0, a patient enters the square area from the middle 
of a side and travels across the area parallel to another side at the constant speed of 1 
m/sec, as shown in red in Fig. 3. In the time span, a person enters the same area at 
random time, location and speed. The time was chosen with a uniform distribution be-
tween time 0 and 200 seconds; the location was chosen with a uniform distribution from 
the middle halves of the 4 sides enclosing the area; the speed remains constant as the 
person traverses the area and was chosen with a uniform distribution between 0.75 
m/sec and 1.25 m/sec. Under the above simulation conditions, the experiments were 
repeated 20,000 times. Fig. 3 shows the trajectory of the patient in red in (a) spatial and 
(b) spatial and temporal coordinates, as well as the trajectories of 4 healthy individuals 
in blue. 
 
Fig. 3. Trajectory of a patient (red) and 5 sample trajectories of healthy individuals (blue)  
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Using Eq. (2), we can compute the infection risk map in the square area induced by 
the presence of the patient. For each healthy individual that traverses the area, Eq. (3) 
provides the person’s risk of contracting the disease. A person is advised to seek further 
testing if their risk exceeds a certain threshold. 
For comparison purposes, we also implemented a spatial proximity-based metric. 
That is, a person is advised to seek testing if the person is within a certain distance from 
the patient at any time. 
We plot in Fig. 4 the probability of correctly identifying a person that actually con-
tracted the disease (true positive) versus the probability of falsely advising a healthy 
person to seek medical help (false positive) by varying the risk threshold for the risk-
based approach (blue lines) and the distance threshold for the proximity-based approach 
(red lines). An ideal system would have true positive probably 1 at 0 false positive 
probability, i.e. the upper left corner in the plots. The 4 plots in Fig. 4 from left to right 
show the different choices in Eq. (1) for 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = 10, 50, 100, 150 seconds respectively. If 
the ability for the virus to infect diminishes quickly over time (e.g. 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = 10 sec), the 
difference between risk-based and proximity-based contact tracing is small Fig. 4(a). 
On the other hand, as the decay time increases (𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = 50, 100 sec), the risk-based ap-
proach performs significantly better than the proximity-based approach Fig. 4(b)(c). It 
becomes apparent in the cases where the virus’ ability to infect diminishes slowly that 
the proximity-based approach cannot fully identify the infected people without incur-
ring unacceptable false positives. 
 
Fig. 4. True positive vs. false positive for different 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 decay rates; lighter-colored lines are from 
results using 1/10 of the simulated trajectories. 
8 
The reason the risk-based and the proximity-based measures differ can be seen in 
Fig. 5. In the figure, we plot the probability of contracting the disease on the x axis and, 
on the y axis, the 1 over the exponential of minimum distance from the infected person 
(i.e. 𝑒𝑒−mindistance), for 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = 50 in Eq. (1). 𝑒𝑒−mindistance is chosen such that a higher 
number means a person is closer to the patient at some point in time and hence subjects 
to a higher probability of being infected. Each point on the scatter plot represents a case 
in the experiment. The marginal distributions (histograms) of the cases are also plotted 
on the top and on the right for the risk-based and the proximity-based measures respec-
tively. If the proximity- and risk-based measures are similar, we would expect to see 
positive correlation on the plot. Even though most cases that are in proximity to the 
patient tend to have higher probabilities of infection, there are significant number of 
cases that are far enough from the patient spatially but are still subjected to high infec-
tion probabilities. It is mainly due to the delayed effect when the patient has left a lo-
cation but the virus in the environment still has the ability to infect. 
 
Fig. 5. Joint distribution of log-probability of infection and exp(-distance) 
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5 Model Refinement 
The experiments conducted in this paper utilize the probabilistic infection risk model 
in Eq. (1) that assumes exponential decay of infection risk in space and time. Since 
various environmental factors can impact how far virus-containing droplets can reach 
and how long the virus can remain contagious in air and on surface, the models can be 
extended to improve its accuracy by incorporating those factors if they are available. 
For example, the variances 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2 and 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 in Eq. (1) can be replaced by a 2-dimensional 
covariance matrix to capture the effects of prevailing wind speed and direction on the 
spread of the droplets. The temporal variance 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 can be a function of the local temper-
ature and humidity. In a confined environment, where infection by way of indirect con-
tacts is possible, we can incorporate surface properties as part of the model. 
Another direction to refine the infection risk estimation is to consider reported cases 
of infection as observations. Consider the scenario where several people that came into 
contacts with a patient in a particular area have been tested for infection. Some of them 
were tested positive while others negative. The test results and their movement histories 
in the area are observations of the underlying risk model. The initial risk model is con-
structed mainly based on the knowledge of average reach and decay time of the virus. 
The new test results, positive or negative, provide additional information to adjust the 
model parameters so as to better align with local conditions. A Bayesian probabilistic 
model is well suited for this purpose: 
 𝜏𝜏  ~ Gamma(𝛼𝛼 ,𝛽𝛽 ),    𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡  ~ Gamma(𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡) (4) 
𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 � =                    �𝑝𝑝0 exp �−𝜏𝜏�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 �2 − 𝜏𝜏�𝑦𝑦 − 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�2 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 �2� , if 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖0 otherwise (5) 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1| 𝑠𝑠 ) =  1 −∏ ∏ �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶 = 1�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗, 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ��𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1  (6) 
𝑇𝑇  ~  Bernoulli�𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1|𝑠𝑠)�  (7) 
Eq. (5) is similar to Eq. (1) except that the variances are re-defined as precisions for 
the convenience of specifying their prior distributions in Eq. (4). The prior distributions 
of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 are Gamma distributions of hyper-parameters (𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) and (𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡) respec-
tively, where the symbol tilde (~) denotes “distributed as.” Eq. (6) is the same as Eq. 
(3). Recall that s represents a sequence of M such 1 m by 1 m by 1 sec spatial-temporal 
cells (𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗) that a person of interest occupies in the vicinity of the patients, and 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1| 𝑠𝑠 ) is the probability of the person contracting the disease. The result of the 
test, positive (𝑇𝑇 = 1) or negative (𝑇𝑇 = 0), is modeled as the outcome of a Bernoulli 
trial as in Eq. (7) where the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution is the infection prob-
ability 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 = 1|𝑠𝑠). 
Based on the above Bayesian probabilistic model, we can refine the model parame-
ters 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 by computing their posterior distributions: 
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𝑃𝑃( 𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡  | 𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿)  (8) 
where 𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 are L individuals’ test outcomes, which are either positive 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1 or 
negative 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 0. Computational methods such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
[12] can be applied to compute the posterior distribution. 
The refined model parameters 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 and the resultant spatio-temporal infection 
risk probability in Eq. (5) then provide a more precise local risk map. By using the 
improved risk map, we can further reduce the chance of missing positive cases and 
optimize the use of resources by avoiding unnecessary testing. 
6 Conclusions 
The impacts of severe travel restrictions are enormous and their cost has been felt 
throughout the economy. Effective contact tracing is a key step in relaxing those 
measures while keeping the infection under control. Traditional contact tracing 
measures based on interviews with patients are labor intensive and error-prone. Contact 
tracing through personal electronic devices such as smartphones has been proposed as 
an effective measure to overcome these challenges. Although smartphone-based con-
tact tracing has been successfully implemented in some countries, the privacy implica-
tion and security concerns can impede broad adoption of similar measures in other so-
cieties. Without wide-spread adoption, the effectiveness of electronic contact tracing 
can be severely limited. 
The proposed electronic contact-tracing approach PrivyTRAC respects privacy of 
individuals and increases security of the system through a de-centralized mechanism. 
By preserving privacy and enhancing security, it will significantly promote cooperation 
from the public and facilitate adoption by public health agencies. Additionally, 
PrivyTRAC improves the accuracy of infection risk estimation and consequently con-
tact tracing effectiveness. As public health agencies are struggling to meet the expected 
demands of qualified personnel for traditional contact tracing measures, PrivyTRAC 
can be an effective tool to fill the resource gap. 
The proposed capability also provides valuable actionable information for authori-
ties to better allocate resources and plan follow-on actions. First, based on the estimated 
infection risks and visitors/foot traffics, authorities can identify and prioritize areas that 
require disinfection. Second, decision makers can pre-position test kits and allocate 
other health resources according to locations, populations and severity of the virus ex-
posure. Similarly, when a person is potentially exposed to the virus, the user App can 
suggest local test locations that best balance test site workloads and convenience. 
The system concept is applicable for COVID-19 as well as for other contagious dis-
eases. By adjusting the disease vector, risk model and environmental effects, the system 
can be tailored to other infectious diseases in the future. The system architecture re-
mains the same. The risk maps are tailored to different diseases in the same App envi-
ronment. 
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